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For family firms, alliances represent a form of heightened entrepreneurial risk-taking.
However, a dearth of research exists on the implications of forms of alliance governance
for family firms. In a study of 939 non-equity alliances of family and non-family firms,
we analyse how contracts and trust influence mutual knowledge creation. Both contract
completeness and trust assist non-family firms in knowledge creation. However, family
firms rely on high levels of trust for the creation of knowledge. Knowledge creation suffers
when family firms encounter very complete contracts tied to attempts at high levels of
trust. The negative interaction effect is especially strong for non-owner-run family firms.
Introduction
Researchers increasingly discuss the differences be-
tween family firms and their non-family counter-
parts (Cesinger et al., 2016; Eddleston et al., 2010;
Feranita, Kotlar and De Massis, 2017). The inter-
ests of the family are at the forefront when fam-
ily firms make risky decisions, such as entering
alliances (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). As set out
by the relational view, alliances allow complemen-
tarities often based on knowledge transfers (Dyer
and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Pesch
and Bouncken, 2018; Weber, Bauke and Raibulet,
2016). While family firms operate on a path-
dependent knowledge stock, they especially fear
the leakage of valuable knowledge about their al-
liance and aim to protect their knowledge (Sirmon
and Hitt, 2003). Simultaneously, family firms need
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to access and create new knowledge through al-
liances. While unilateral knowledge transfers are
highly risky, firms might secure value creation and
capture by creating mutual knowledge with their
alliance partners (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).
Mutual knowledge creation can stem from trans-
ferring, merging and marvelling about knowledge,
creating further potential spillovers.
However, mutual knowledge creation needs
coordination in the alliance. Previous (non-equity)
alliance research concentrated on trust and/or
contracts as coordination or governance mech-
anisms (Makadok and Coff, 2009; Oxley, 1997).
Contracts and their enforcement may secure value
creation and capture, but often alongside what
has been foreseen and stated in the initial contract
(Reuer and Ariño, 2007). The dynamic relational
view emphasizes that trust can promote social
processes and learning between firms (Dyer and
Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Trust, often
developed in repeated and anticipated future ties
(Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998),
thus fosters the exchange of knowledge, might ac-
tivate unforeseen value and allows more flexibility
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over the course of the alliance. Still, value creation
and capture might be limited in a trust regime,
by inducing partner ‘blindness’ and ignorance
of external information, especially weak signals
(Szulanski, Cappetta and Jensen, 2004).
The relationship between trust and contracts
built a long-term debate in alliance research
(Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Contracts and/or
trust might facilitate mutual knowledge creation
in alliances, but trust might increase flexibility
and serendipity and thus serve better the mu-
tual knowledge creation among firms (Larsson
et al., 1998; Squire, Cousins and Brown, 2009).
The dilemma is that excessive trust can increase
cognitive lock-ins that damage knowledge creation
(Bermiss and Greenbaum, 2015). Value appropri-
ation might become endangered when trust sub-
stitutes contracts (Oxley, 1997). Conversely, con-
tracts can signal distrust (Bouncken et al., 2020;
Fredrich, Bouncken and Kraus, 2019). In sum,
studies report various and conflicting findings on
trust and detailed contracts, suggesting that firm
characteristics and contingencies are at play (Cao
and Lumineau, 2015).
Previous research has not considered trust and
contracts for alliances by family firms. Family
firms use fewer external relationships because
they put at risk the family’s resources, especially
their knowledge stocks (Carney, 2005; Pittino and
Visintin, 2011). Family firms emphasize trust in
general (Scholes, Mustafa and Chen, 2016), which
might then also stretch to their use of trust for
knowledge creation with external entities (Stanley
and McDowell, 2014). The question is how trust
and contracts affect mutual knowledge creation in
family firms compared to non-family firms.
The theoretical background of our study is the
dynamic relational view, which we extend with the
trust–contract discussion in alliance governance
(Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Our model assumes
that non-family firms can benefit from more com-
plete contracts to safeguard value creation and
value capture that allows mutual knowledge cre-
ation. Differently, very complete contracts impose
expectations and restrictions that are unattractive
or uncommon to family firms, which are used to
acting more autonomously and allowing flexibil-
ity through intense trustful personal relationships
(Carney, 2005). Trust does not dilute the family’s
control over their business when entering alliance
relationships (Cesinger et al., 2016) and is a pillar
of their flexibility-oriented strategic activities
(Scholes, Mustafa and Chen, 2016). Thus, our
model assumes that non-family firms can improve
knowledge creation by following a contractual
logic or using the advantages of trusting relation-
ships too. Instead, family firms will favour trust
for mutual knowledge creation, and heavily spec-
ified contracts may be damaging their knowledge
creation in alliances.
Our study of 939 firms trading in Europe
from two industries (packaging and medical de-
vice manufacturing) industries on their non-equity
alliances finds that family firms achieve high mu-
tual knowledge creation when they follow trust
only. In both industries, mutual knowledge cre-
ation might emerge from exchanging knowledge
about technical potentials and customer demands
within a regulated frame. Co-developing knowl-
edge will help to connect technical components in
a novel way, alter the design and integrate new
customer demands. Considering alliance gover-
nance, non-family firms can use trust and contract
completeness independently and jointly, but fam-
ily firms cannot, and their deleterious effects are
greater for those family firms that are non-owner-
run businesses. Our results contribute to theory
and research on family firm management, alliance
governance and family firm alliance research spec-
ifying the conditions for family firm alliances. The
boundary condition of our research is that we
focus on contracts and trust (Bacharach, 1989;
Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Clauss and Bouncken,
2019).
Theoretical background
Alliances refer to ‘any voluntarily initiated coop-
erative agreements between firms’ (Gulati, 1995,
pp. 620–621). Following the dominant lenses in
alliance research, the relational and the dynamic
relational views, alliances allow complementar-
ities that are often based on opportunities for
learning in alliances (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer
and Singh, 1998). Knowledge exchanges create
relational rents, improve their partner-specific
understanding and discover further comple-
mentarities (Weber, Bauke and Raibulet, 2016).
Mutual knowledge creation among allying firms
can provide far more significant complemen-
tarities and creativity than a plain transfer of
knowledge among allying firms can do for both
innovation and firm performance (Buckley et al.,
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2009). The merger, recombination and reciprocity
of knowledge, especially of rich tacit knowledge
(Bouncken and Barwinski, 2020), underpinning
mutual knowledge creation breed creativity (Grant
and Baden-Fuller, 2004). However, how can firms
facilitate mutual knowledge creation in alliances?
Contracts and trust are the main governance
mechanisms in alliances (Cao and Lumineau,
2015; Makadok and Coff, 2009; Oxley, 1997).
Value-creating processes are regularly subject to
an instrumental, calculative logic associated with
contracts, but are tempered by a relational logic
associated with trust (Carney, 2005), necessary to
substitute for incomplete contracts or complement
elements a contract cannot specify (Bouncken
et al., 2018; Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Costs in
governing the alliance then offset the extent to
which alliances are successful in creating value
for firms. Value creation and appropriability are
a concern for firms because the output of innova-
tion activity is novel and often knowledge-based
(Bouncken et al., 2020). Alliance governance is
necessary to demotivate and restrict excessive or
harmfully opportunistic value appropriation by
one party at the expense of the other (Bouncken,
Pesch and Gudergan, 2015; Ireland, Hitt and
Vaidyanath, 2002).
Trust is confidence between parties that none
of them will engage in opportunistic behaviour
that would exploit others’ vulnerabilities, and
thereby violate the values, principles and stan-
dards of behaviour they have internalized as
part of the exchange (Xavier Molina-Morales,
Teresa Martínez-Fernández and Torlò, 2011).
High trust, as a key relational mechanism, reduces
costs relating to search, screening, adjustment and
contract enforcement (Gulati, 1998), but adds cost
to do with reciprocity, unspecified obligations and
the maintenance of trust over an uncertain time
horizon (Carney, 2005). Trustful ties are less likely
to trigger questioning, scrutiny, validation and
search (Szulanski, Cappetta and Jensen, 2004),
but trust between alliance partners facilitates the
transfer of knowledge, especially the transfer of
tacit knowledge (Meier, 2011).
Appropriability mechanisms (e.g. patents, con-
fidentiality agreements and contracts) demotivate
and restrict opportunism and excess value appro-
priation by one party at the expense of the other
(Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 2002). Modest
use of appropriability mechanisms fosters inno-
vation among heterogeneous partners and limits
knowledge leakages in innovation collaborations
(Miozzo et al., 2016). Contracts allow formal en-
forcement, limit opportunistic behaviour (Gulati,
1998) and the possibility of conflicts (Miozzo
et al., 2016). They can offer a sense of stabil-
ity, normality or standardization to an alliance
(Argyres and Mayer, 2007). However, contracts
cannot predict all eventualities or specify all
contingencies and situations precisely, thereby
limiting the freedom of the parties involved in the
alliance (Oxley, 1997). Raising the completeness
of contracts to reduce risk from opportunistic
behaviour and conflict may restrict the co-creation
of knowledge because highly complete contracts
may limit co-learning opportunities due to the
fear of breaching contractual terms whose con-
sequences cannot fully be anticipated. Empirical
evidence in this regard is not consistent, though.
Miozzo et al. (2016) find that heavy emphasis
on formal appropriability mechanisms in inno-
vation collaborations has adverse effects (e.g.
conflicts over ownership, overly time-consuming
approval for joint projects and damaging trust).
Contrarily, some studies show that firms are more
willing to collaborate for innovation under strong
formal appropriability mechanisms (Pisano and
Teece, 2007) and more complete contracts fa-
cilitate joint innovation among firms (Massini
and Miozzo, 2012). But does this apply to family
firms?
Familiness describes the uniqueness of family
businesses (Hughes et al., 2018). It constitutes and
describes the influence of the family – the famili-
ness – of a family business (Frank et al., 2016).
Family firms rely on trust (Cabrera-Suárez, Déniz-
Déniz and Martín-Santana, 2015) and exhibit low
risk propensity (Naldi et al., 2007) while placing
significant priority on maintaining independence
and family control (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In-
ternal ties, established patterns of interaction and
involvement create shared meanings among fam-
ily members (Cabrera-Suárez, Déniz-Déniz and
Martín-Santana, 2015). This is why family mem-
bers exchange and create knowledge efficiently and
why family members also have deep levels of firm-
specific knowledge (Salvato andMelin, 2008). This
strong internal social capital facilitates the recog-
nition, assimilation and use of specialized knowl-
edge by family members (Arregle et al., 2007;
Salvato and Melin, 2008), but it can be a sub-
stantial impediment to introducing new ideas and
strategies (Herrero and Hughes, 2019). External
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relationships may solve knowledge deficits among
family firms (Herrero and Hughes, 2019).
Alliances may then be powerful means for
family firms, but family firms bear governance
preferences that have implications for allying
(Carney, 2005) and knowledge creation, which
literature has not researched yet. We predict an
overall theoretical framework forecasting why
family firm alliance governance will likely and
necessarily differ from their non-family counter-
parts to engender mutual knowledge creation.
Processes of accessing and absorbing knowledge
expose the knowledge-donating firm to dangers of
opportunism and problems in learning at the same
rate as its partner. Firms have to balance value cre-
ation and value capture (Ritala et al., 2013). This is
unpalatable to a family firm due to dangers of free
riding, the leakage of valuable knowledge (Nieto,
Santamaria and Fernandez, 2015) and less control
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Nevertheless, alliances
can be a key source of learning and innovation for
family firms (Zahra, 2010). This holds for mutual
knowledge creation. As the emphasis shifts to ac-
tive co-creation of new knowledge, rather than just
transferring knowledge to and from one another,
the knowledge-donating firm is less vulnerable to
dangers of opportunism in learning. Nonetheless,
coordination and protection of trust and contracts
are still necessary for non-equity alliances where
formal hierarchies are low or absent (Bradach and
Eccles, 1989), especially when they involve uncer-
tain innovation processes. Trust is, arguably, a vital
parameter for all firms engaged in alliances, but the
priority it has in contrast to contracts is sensitive
to the type of firm. Family firms are more likely to
draw on the rich social capital within existing ties
to acquire information, regardless of their strategic
value (Herrero and Hughes, 2019). Alliances pro-
vide complementary resources that the family firm
might need as a trigger for innovation and firm
performance (Feranita, Kotlar and De Massis,
2017). Because they are answerable to the family
rather than traditional shareholders, family firms
value their sovereignty over decision rights and
control rights (Carney, 2005); managers of non-
family firms are well versed in the expectations and
diligence required by their separate owners (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). Expectations imposed by
the contract then impose potentially unattractive
restrictions on family firms used to acting with few
constraints. Consequently, family firms will look
for reciprocal exchanges in alliances that favour
mutual knowledge creation, conditioned by an al-
liance governance framework that protects family
interests.
Hypotheses
Interplay between contracts and trust
Contracts act as a basis for economic exchanges
but carry high costs when possessingmore detailed
or context-related clauses about obligations, en-
forcement, controls and rights. Kale, Singh and
Perlmutter (2000) assume that contracts enhance
alliance partners’ commitment and impede un-
wanted knowledge loss. Trust soothes relation-
ships between firms, especially increasing knowl-
edge exchanges and learning, as emphasized in the
relational view (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Weber, Bauke and Raibulet, 2016).
Yet, the relationship between trust and contracts
has been subject to long-term debate in alliance
research (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). The ques-
tion of either trust or contracts represents a sin-
gular view of governance, while trust and con-
tracts in a complementary relationship relates to a
plural view of governance (Bouncken, Clauß and
Fredrich, 2016). In the singular governance view,
trust might substitute formalized contracts or oth-
erwise (Clauss and Bouncken, 2019). In studies
of plural governance, the question is how trust
and contracts are combined and influenced by
other factors and dynamics (e.g. power or compet-
itive behaviour) (Bouncken et al., 2020; Fredrich,
Bouncken and Kraus, 2019).
Completeness of contracts
Contract completeness describes how well the
transaction is fully reflected in the contract (Ariño
and Reuer, 2005). More complete contracts help
to reduce opportunistic behaviour and task uncer-
tainties, such that alliance partners tend to spec-
ify obligations and returns (Argyres and Mayer,
2007). More complete formal contracts enforce
firms to articulate targets, tasks and safeguards to
secure value creation and value capture (Vlaar, Van
den Bosch and Volberda, 2006). Contracts are a
framework which allow a degree of freedom and
flexibility for knowledge creation but within clear
boundaries.
Family members’ wealth is concentrated in
the firm, which increases their sensitivity to
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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uncertainty and investments (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007). This raises the assumption that family firms
prefer complete contracts in governing alliances.
However, forming more complete contracts will
hinder the flexibility and openness needed for
the sharing and exploration of new knowledge
(Larsson et al., 1998). The non-overlapping nature
of knowledge combination and novel creation
requires unforeseeable processes of interaction,
exchange and collaboration during the alliance.
Because contracts are bi-directional, enforcing
protections and endowing rights to the family
firm’s allying partner, the family firm must con-
cede a degree of control, which is incompatible
with preserving socioemotional wealth.
Family firms’ long-term orientation and stew-
ardship attitude exempts them from the pressure
for short-term paybacks and allows them to invest
in more radical ideas (Dunn, 1996). Although
greater contract completeness brings an extensive
range of conditions to account for and protect the
financial and non-financial wealth of family firms,
they will find highly complex contractual require-
ments less appealing than non-family firms. The
calculative rationality (Carney, 2005) of complete
contracts reduces the family’s absolute control
over the business and its activities (Anderson
and Reeb, 2003) and limits creativity. Instead,
calculative rationality will be the dominant logic
for non-family firms because of their account-
ability towards shareholders (Carney, 2005). In
family firms, non-owner-run and owner-run alike,
the family is the critical decision-making and
control authority, putting a heavy premium on
trust and while not working with very complete
contracts.
Compared to family firms, managers in non-
family firms must justify any form of tacit, extra-
contractual or relational commitments. They
thus tend to limit their investment to codified
knowledge (Anand and Galetovic, 2000). Legal
contracts with standard boilerplate provisions are
unattractive because not all exchanges are neatly
rationalized (Macaulay, 1963). More complete
contracts can account for many contingencies.
The typical non-family firm will thus rationally
define alliance terms, select partners, maintain re-
lationships and terminate them based upon clear
criteria defined through contracts. Yet, family
firms with a non-family manager might prefer
more complete contracts for the greater number
of safeguards they provide. Owners of family
firms instead might use less complete contracts
because ownership and managing responsibilities
are more united and there is a stronger iden-
tification with family values. We thus assume
differences among family and non-family firms
and between owner-run and non-owner-run family
firms.
H1a: Growing levels of contract complete-
ness are less positively associated with
mutual knowledge creation in alliances
of owner-run family firms than of non-
family firms.
H1b: Growing levels of contract complete-
ness are less positively associated with
mutual knowledge creation in alliances
of non-owner-run family firms than of
non-family firms.
Trust
The relational view stresses the importance of
repeated ties and trust among allying firms (e.g.
Dyer and Hatch, 2006). Greater trust among
partners decreases dysfunctional conflicts and
lowers the need for contractual safeguards (Greve,
Mitsuhashi and Baum, 2013). Trust can also
stimulate greater closeness, dialogue, flexibility
and open information and knowledge exchange
(Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven, 2006),
couched in the assumption that partners will
neither misuse nor misappropriate the knowl-
edge. This improves the transformation of shared
information into new and mutual knowledge
(Bigley and Pearce, 1998). Still, trustful interac-
tions can induce partner blindness and ignorance
of external information, especially weak signals
(Szulanski, Cappetta and Jensen, 2004).
Family firms especially tend to rely significantly
on trust to coordinate relationships and alliances,
and that might be significantly more important
than in non-family firms (Eddleston et al., 2010;
Scholes, Mustafa and Chen, 2016; Steier, 2001).
This is especially strong for owner-run family firms
compared to non-owner-run family firms. Family
members act as stewards of the family business
(Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009), potentially
enabling family leaders to build an enduring
reputation and strong and trustful relations with
external stakeholders (i.e. external social capital)
(Herrero and Hughes, 2019). Non-owner man-
agers of family firms might also act as stewards
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of the family business, but do not share entirely
the family’s identity and they are less integrated
in the family (Miller, Breton-Miller and Lester,
2011). Thus, the influence of trust on the alliance,
especially on mutual knowledge creation, might
be less in non-owner-run than owner-run family
firms. Trust requires no dilution of the family’s
control at the hands of another party and does not
require legal commitment. We expect that family
firms (especially owner-run ones) will prioritize
trust as an alliance coordination mechanism
because it favours a situation where authority,
control and monitoring are centralized into the
business and not into a mechanism, which enables
contractual oversight by third parties. Specialized
knowledge held by family members makes family
firms vulnerable in alliances but under higher
levels of trust, the family’s direct control and
ownership rights over its assets, resources and
knowledge are protected, incentivizing it towards
mutual knowledge creation with alliance partners.
Rather, non-family firms will take advantage of
managerial governance under normal conditions
and prioritize rational economic decisions that
emphasize contracts because of their fiduciary
responsibility to shareholders. Thus:
H2a: Growing levels of trust are more pos-
itively associated with mutual knowl-
edge creation in alliances of owner-run
family firms than of non-family firms.
H2b: Growing levels of trust are more pos-
itively associated with mutual knowl-
edge creation in alliances of non-own-
er-run family firms than of non-family
firms.
Following the plural governance view, firms use
some mix of trust and contracts in alliances. How-
ever, the alliance governance literature disagrees
on whether their effects are substitutive or com-
plementary (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Deferral
to the contract may not be seen as particularly
destructive or obstructive for non-family firms
(Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998). Non-family
firms can use the advantages of trust when specific
tasks cannot be integrated into contracts without
high costs, or in cases where social dynamics are
necessary. The non-family firm can concurrently
use contract completeness for those remaining al-
liance tasks that can only be performed efficiently
or reliably through carefully defined terms. Thus,
the combination of trust and contracts can be ad-
vantageous for mutual knowledge creation among
non-family firms.
For family firms, specified regulations in con-
tracts can impede the trustful sharing of knowl-
edge (Larsson et al., 1998) and its upscaling into
mutual knowledge creation. Family members will
intervene in the affairs of the business and substi-
tute rational economic criteria with particularistic
criteria (Carney, 2005), in large part to protect
the family’s control, influence, wealth and identity
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). If partners demand
the full gamut of clauses within contracts to occur
when trust is in place, we expect it to limit the flow
of knowledge and constrain mutual knowledge
creation for these firms. The prescriptive nature of
complete contracts risks over-specifying responsi-
bilities and outcomes, leaving less room for synergy
more likely under conditions of trust. When con-
tracts are heavily specified, a partner is more likely
to rely too much on the procedures set out in the
contract, and any openness through greater trust
may not come to pass. Partners may not find it
necessary to do more or to contribute more, even
if they would or could do due to increased trust.
While the non-family firm will more likely discern
such behaviour as rational and economic (Carney,
2005), the socio-economic mindset of family
owners and managers and family involvement
(Hughes et al., 2018) and ownership (Carney,
2005) suggests inwardly oriented behaviour to
protect and preserve family wealth and control
rights.
The importance of trust to family firms and the
desire to minimize dilution of family ownership
and control rights creates an incompatibility be-
tween high trust and high contract completeness,
building a fuzzy environment for mutual knowl-
edge creation. Contracts create the need for costly
monitoring and incentive arrangements. Since the
family’s wealth is tied to the wealth of the business,
there is an incentive to minimize cost. Even in non-
owner-run family firms, the family identifies the
business as an extension of the family (Demsetz
and Lehn, 1985). The family, as the critical
decision-making and control authority, renders
family firms unwilling to abide by practices that
challenge or inhibit their ownership privileges
(Carney, 2005). Family firms will unlikely operate
in alliances that threaten family control over the
firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), family values,
family resources (Miller and Le Breton-Miller,
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Figure 1. Framework and hypotheses
2005) or family knowledge (Pittino and Visintin,
2011). Contracts allowing control and sanctions
might signal distrust to this end, which recursively
lowers trust and openness to mutual knowledge
creation (Connelly, Miller and Devers, 2012). The
management of non-owner-run family firmsmight
follow greater calculative rationality with simi-
larities to the management of non-family firms
(Carney, 2005), whereas owner-managers fre-
quently rely extensively on arm’s-length contrac-
tual transactions but maintain close relations with
a subset of trusted partners (Uzzi, 1997).
Non-family managers have a very different
agency relationship. Their scrutiny at the hands of
family members is more intense. Compared with
owner-run family firms, the family firm with exter-
nal management may experience fewer disadvan-
tages for mutual knowledge creation from comple-
menting trust logic with contractual completeness
that defines tasks and monitoring for the alliance
and some terms of the knowledge exchanges and
creation. Contract completeness allied with high
trust is then likely to be a strategy by non-owner
managers to protect the family’s control rights
and their own positions to work towards mutual
knowledge creation with alliance partners. Thus:
H3a: Trust and contract completeness neg-
atively interact with each other on mu-
tual knowledge creation in family firms.
H3b: Trust and contract completeness have
lesser negative interaction effects on
mutual knowledge creation in non-
owner-run than owner-run family firms.
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework.
Methodology
Sample
We drew on a sample of firms trading in Europe
frommedical technology device developers and the
packaging industry. We selected these two indus-
tries because both represent knowledge-intensive
and innovative industries. Medical devices are
strongly regulated, and a product needs to pass
extensive approval. Instead, packaging is a fast-
moving industry due to changing consumer pref-
erences (e.g. more personalization, convenience
or sustainability) and dynamic behaviour among
competitors (Feber, Nordigården and Varanasi,
2019), while also facing safety regulations (Fang
et al., 2017). Packaging firms must innovate (e.g.
intelligent packaging, new sustainable materials,
radio-frequency identification (RFID) technol-
ogy) to secure competitive advantage (Fang et al.,
2017). Feber, Nordigården and Varanasi (2019)
show that industry trends in the packaging sector
call for intensified collaboration with suppliers, re-
tailers and technology providers. Similarly, medi-
cal technology device developersmust innovate be-
cause healthcare budgets in developed countries
are falling, resulting in cost pressure and the need
for highly efficient R&D. Regulatory regimes are
becoming more complex and new players with
technological and data analytics capabilities enter
the market (Stirling and Shehata, 2016). Collab-
oration rather than in-house efforts increasingly
drive innovation and accelerate speed to market in
the industry (Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2016).
Following previous research (Filser et al., 2018),
we define the family firm (FF) as a firm where
the majority of company shares (more than 50%)
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample (N = 938) and for the subsamples of non-family-firms (NFF), non-owner-run family-firms
(NRFF) and owner-run family firms (ORFF) with the non-parametric test statistic
Overall
(N = 938)
NFF
(N = 307)
NRFF
(N = 442)
ORFF
(N = 189)
Comparing NFF,
NRFF and ORFF
Mean (SD) Kruskal–Wallis test
H(df); p-value
Firm size 836 (9,991) 2,346 (17,044) 64 (62) 38 (44) 102.68 (2); 0.00
Firm age 31.4 (28.0) 32.3 (32.7) 33.7 (26.4) 24.5 (21.8) 28.69 (2); 0.00
R&D intensity 17.2 (18.0) 18.5 (20.4) 15.6 (14.5) 18.2 (20.1) 0.21 (2); 0.90
ROI 25.3 (20.7) 26.7 (21.7) 24.7 (19.5) 24.1 (21.5) 0.93 (2); 0.63
Frequencies (%) Chi2(df); p-value
OEM 81.2 79.8 83.0 79.4 1.78 (2); 0.41
First tier 20.5 23.1 19.5 18.5 2.05 (2); 0.36
Second tier 6.7 7.5 6.6 5.8 0.55 (2); 0.76
Trade 12.2 8.5 13.3 15.3 6.30 (2); 0.04
Service 10.4 11.7 9.5 10.6 0.96 (2); 0.62
Medical 75.9 83.4 71.9 73.0 14.05 (2); 0.00
Packing 24.1 16.6 28.1 27.0 14.05 (2); 0.00
are in the hands of one or two families. We first
collected contact information from the Amadeus
database and then gathered lists from industry
trade fairs and company homepages for more di-
rect access to senior managers. In total, we sent out
our paper-and-pencil questionnaire with a cover
letter to 8,000 firms. Following previous alliance
research (Pesch and Bouncken, 2018), we asked
the respondents at the beginning of the survey to
base their responses on one alliance they had sig-
nificant knowledge about and were responsible for.
If the contacted senior manager was not knowl-
edgeable about and actively involved in any of
her/his firm’s alliances, we asked the senior man-
ager to forward the survey to another senior man-
ager who fulfils this criterion. The participating
senior manager answered the questions regarding
our dependent variable mutual knowledge cre-
ation. A secondmanager in each firm answered the
questions regarding the independent variables. To
contact this second informant, we asked the senior
manager to provide us with contact information
of a further manager who was knowledgeable and
involved in the selected alliance.
All firms are trading in Europe, whereas 63.3%
come from Europe (40.3% from Germany, 13.2%
from Italy, 7.1% from Great Britain), 16.4% from
Asia (52.4% from China) and 20.6% from other
countries worldwide (40.9% from the USA). The
final sample of 938 alliances consists of 307
non-family firms (NFF) and 631 family firms.
For the analysis, the family firms were split into
442 non-owner-run family firms (NRFF) and 189
owner-run family firms (ORFF). Contrary to non-
owner-run family firms, owner-run family firms
are firms in which family members are a member
of the executive board.We searched databases and
companies’ homepages to establish whether fam-
ily firm members belong to the executive board.
Only 32.0% of the non-family firms allied with
family firms, but 56.5% of the family firms allied
with other family firms, and this value is much
higher for owner-run family firms (71.4%). The
mean of firms’ size differs significantly: 836 em-
ployees in the total sample, 64 in non-owner-run
family firms, 2,346 in non-family firms and 38 in
owner-run family firms (Table 1). The firms’ aver-
age age was 31.4 years in the total sample. Owner-
run family firms are significantly younger (24.5
years). R&D intensity (R&D investments/sales) of
17.2% and return on investment (ROI) of 25.3%
in the total sample do not differ significantly.
The family firms in our sample are more often a
distributor, less represented in medical technology
but more in the packaging industry (see Table 1).
Measures
Our study operationalizes mutual knowledge cre-
ation, contract completeness and trust in the al-
liance as latent variables each with three reflec-
tive indicators measured on five-point Likert-type
scales. The heart of mutual knowledge creation is
the merger of knowledge between alliance part-
ners to develop novel ideas and products (Postrel,
2002). For contract completeness, we used the
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Results of CFA and chi2-difference test between configural and factor-loading invariant models
Construct Indicators FL CR AVE FLR
Trust Our cooperation partner has always been
even-handed in its negotiations with us.
0.81 0.88 0.70 0.16
Our cooperation partner is always trustworthy. 0.91
Our cooperation partner keeps promises made to
our firm.
0.79
Contract
completeness
Our collaboration is regulated through a
comprehensive and clearly worded contract.
0.89 0.93 0.82 0.13
The contract with this partner describes in detail
every aspect that we think is of interest.
0.94
We and our partner secured all the
collaboration-concerning details in a contract.
0.89
Mutual knowledge
creation
We mutually develop novel
ideas/insights/products, etc. with our
collaboration partner.
0.81 0.85 0.65 0.18
We mutually find novel solutions by sharing
knowledge with our partner.
0.87
We share and merge knowledge to accomplish
new projects successfully.
0.74
Chi2(df) RMSEA CFI SRMR Delta chi2(df) p-Value
Configural (baseline) model 140.75 (90) 0.05 0.98 0.05 11.7 (15) 0.70
Factor-loading invariant model 152.43 (105) 0.04 0.98 0.06
Notes: Rows shows standardized factor loadings (FL), composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted (AVE) and Fornell–
Larcker ratio (FLR) for the factor-loading invariant model as root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit
index (CFI) and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) for both models.
items of Liu, Li and Zhang (2010). Inter-firm trust
was measured with the items of Zaheer, McEvily
and Perrone (1998).
With amulti-group confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) we confirm the relations between the latent
variables and their indicators, and we compare
the measurement model invariance across groups
(non-family firms, non-owner-run family firms
and owner-run family firms). The factor-loading
invariant model does not fit the data quite as
well as it did with no factor-loading constraints
imposed. Because the chi2-difference test gives
a non-significant result, we consider the con-
firmatory model with factor-loading invariance
between groups in the following analyses. The re-
sults of the CFA support construct reliability and
discriminant validity for all latent variables (see
Table 2).
To avoid omitted variables bias, we include
control variables in the analysis. Firm size, mea-
sured by calculating the logarithm of the number
of employees in each firm, can influence the
need to form alliances and the capabilities of
alliance governance. Firm age might bring rigidi-
ties that impact knowledge creation. The supply
chain position shapes a firm’s knowledge stocks
and demands for knowledge. We considered the
firm’s supply chain position as dummy variables.
We controlled for research intensity of the firm
because it has a strong relationship with tech-
nology and innovation behaviour. Industry was
controlled for because appropriability regimes
differ across technologies and sectors (Hall et al.,
2014)
Table 3 shows the correlations of themodel vari-
ables and other variables of interest in the sample.
Non-owner-run family firms and owner-run fam-
ily firms show a significant positive relationship
and both family-firm types show a significant
negative relation with firm size. Furthermore,
non-owner-run family firms are positively related
to trading activities. Owner-run family firms show
a significant negative correlation with firm age,
which does not apply to non-owner-run fam-
ily firms. Non-owner-run family firms show a
significant positive relationship with trust and
a significant negative relationship with contract
completeness.
Tables 6 and 7 provide further informa-
tion about the sample of non-owner-run and
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Stepwise analysis of controls (Model 1), contract completeness and trust (Model 2) and their interaction (Model 3) on mutual
knowledge creation for non-family firms (NFF; N = 307), non-owner-run family firms (NRFF; N = 442) and owner-run family firms
(ORFF; N = 189)
NFF NRFF ORFF
Est. z p Est. z p Est. z p
Model 1
Log(firm size) 0.160† 1.827 0.068 0.025 0.375 0.708 0.081 0.799 0.424
Firm age −0.010 −0.130 0.896 −0.007 −0.104 0.917 0.177† 1.848 0.065
OEM 0.009 0.100 0.920 0.007 0.113 0.910 0.093 0.802 0.423
First tier −0.006 −0.077 0.938 0.186*** 3.277 0.001 0.017 0.167 0.867
Second tier 0.022 0.322 0.747 −0.044 −0.781 0.435 0.009 0.075 0.940
Trade 0.060 0.675 0.500 −0.027 −0.428 0.669 −0.009 −0.082 0.935
Service 0.088 1.060 0.289 0.071 1.311 0.190 0.151† 1.710 0.087
R&D intensity 0.102 0.971 0.332 −0.060 −0.493 0.622 0.336** 2.632 0.008
R2 0.039 1.208 0.227 0.043† 1.768 0.077 0.143† 1.761 0.078
Model 2
Log(firm size) 0.134 1.535 0.125 0.050 0.770 0.441 0.065 0.634 0.526
Firm age −0.013 −0.177 0.859 0.012 0.180 0.857 0.131 1.328 0.184
OEM 0.024 0.311 0.756 0.017 0.282 0.778 0.088 0.779 0.436
First tier 0.024 0.325 0.745 0.172*** 3.203 0.001 −0.006 −0.061 0.951
Second tier 0.019 0.342 0.732 −0.012 −0.213 0.831 0.020 0.183 0.855
Trade 0.084 1.054 0.292 −0.049 −0.751 0.453 −0.067 −0.637 0.524
Service 0.060 0.752 0.452 0.061 1.186 0.235 0.141† 1.676 0.094
R&D intensity 0.056 0.580 0.562 0.087 0.723 0.470 0.214 1.396 0.163
Contract completeness 0.310*** 3.890 0.000 0.053 0.824 0.410 0.118 1.133 0.257
Trust 0.267*** 3.258 0.001 0.349*** 4.689 0.000 0.127 1.252 0.211
R2 0.237*** 3.729 0.000 0.162*** 3.397 0.001 0.148* 1.973 0.049
Model 3
Log(firm size) 0.101 1.601 0.109 0.093 1.100 0.271 0.072 0.652 0.514
Firm age −0.004 −0.055 0.956 −0.004 −0.062 0.950 0.192 1.449 0.147
OEM 0.031 0.408 0.683 0.018 0.307 0.759 0.084 0.744 0.457
First tier 0.024 0.331 0.741 0.178*** 3.311 0.001 −0.004 −0.043 0.966
Second tier 0.022 0.413 0.679 −0.014 −0.253 0.800 0.018 0.162 0.871
Trade 0.081 1.069 0.285 −0.045 −0.699 0.485 −0.056 −0.540 0.589
Service 0.063 0.829 0.407 0.066 1.282 0.200 0.133 1.572 0.116
R&D intensity 0.057 0.731 0.465 0.091 0.375 0.707 0.267* 2.098 0.036
Contract completeness 0.289*** 3.741 0.000 0.071 1.010 0.313 0.083 0.938 0.348
Trust 0.287*** 3.810 0.000 0.349*** 4.154 0.000 0.187† 1.768 0.077
Contract completeness × trust 0.023 0.278 0.781 −0.165* −2.459 0.014 −0.033 −0.332 0.740
R2 0.236*** 4.294 0.000 0.213*** 3.648 0.000 0.167* 2.453 0.014
Notes: Fit indices for Model 2 are chi2(df) = 453.21 (315), RMSEA = 0.04; CFI = 0.96, SRMR = 0.05. Rows show estimated stan-
dardized structural coefficients (Est.) and robust standard errors in parentheses (S.E.) from the multi-group model with N = 938.
Coefficients are significant with p-values ≤0.001***, ≤0.01**, ≤0.05* and ≤0.10†.
owner-run family firms (e.g. the phases of the
alliance lifecycle in which family firms rely on high
trust in their partners).
Analysis methods
To test our hypotheses, we use structural equation
modelling (SEM)withMplus (version 8). To check
path differences for non-family firms, non-owner-
run family firms and owner-run family firms, we
use a multi-group approach with non-family firms,
non-owner-run family firms and owner-run family
firms as the grouping variable. For the interaction
of contract completeness and trust, we apply the
latent moderated structural equations approach
(LMS) (Klein and Moosbrugger, 2000).
Table 4 shows the estimated path coefficients,
z-values and p-values for non-family firms, non-
owner-run family firms and owner-run family
firms. The estimations are stepwise reported for
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 2. Influence of contract completeness (left) and trust (right) on mutual knowledge creation in non-family firms (NFF), non-owner-
run family firms (NRFF) and owner-run family firms (ORFF)
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Figure 3. Interaction of contract completeness and trust on mutual knowledge creation in NRFF. Figures show the predicted mutual knowl-
edge creation with 95% confidence interval (dotted lines) for low trust (left) and high trust (right). With high trust (right) and up to high
contract completeness, mutual knowledge creation decreases with increasing contract completeness. With further increasing of contract
completeness, the lower confidence bound is below zero, which means no substantive deviation from average mutual knowledge creation
the control variables (Model 1), adding contract
completeness and trust (Model 2) and adding the
latent interaction of contract completeness with
trust (Model 3) on mutual knowledge creation.
To examine the hypotheses, we use a path-
difference test to compare the estimated structural
coefficients for non-owner-run family firms with
non-family firms, and non-owner-run family firms
with owner-run family firms for Hypothesis 3b.
We denote coefficients and differences with p-
values lower than 0.10 as significant by tendency.
We provide typical plots of the effects of trust
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Figure 4. Interaction of trust and contract completeness on mutual knowledge creation in NRFF. Figures show the predicted mutual knowl-
edge creation with 95% confidence interval (dotted lines) for low contract completeness (left) and high contract completeness (right).
With high contract completeness (right), increasing trust cannot substantively promote mutual knowledge creation
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Family Firms, Alliance and Knowledge 13
Table 5. Results of regression models with MIIV-2SLS and specification tests for the model-implied instrumental variables
NFF NRFF ORFF
Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. P
Model 2a
Trust’s indicator 1 0.34 (0.13) ** 0.38 (0.13) ** 0.53 (0.16) **
Contract’s indicator 1 0.31 (0.10) ** 0.07 (0.08) 0.07 (0.09)
Weak instruments test df1 (df2) F-val. p-val. df1 (df2) F-val. p-val. df1 (df2) F-val. p-val.
Trust’s indicator 1 10 (95) 10.75 0.00 10 (129) 15.14 0.00 10 (61) 6.50 0.00
Contract’s indicator 1 10 (95) 16.79 0.00 10 (129) 37.32 0.00 10 (61) 11.25 0.00
Wu–Hausman test 2 (101) 2.15 0.12 2 (135) 4.31 0.02 2 (67) 1.25 0.29
Sargan test df chi2-val. p-val. df chi2-val. p-val. df chi2-val. p-val.
8 7.50 0.48 8 9.64 0.29 8 2.35 0.97
Model 3a
Trust’s indicator 1 0.34 (0.13) * 0.44 (0.15) ** 0.53 (0.16) **
Contract’s indicator 1 0.31 (0.14) ** 0.04 (0.08) 0.05 (0.10)
Interaction 1 0.01 (0.13) 0.14 (0.11) 0.06 (0.14)
Weak instruments test df1 (df2) F-val. p-val. df1 (df2) F-val. p-val. df1 (df2) F-val. p-val.
Trust’s indicator 1 11 (94) 10.03 0.00 11 (128) 14.08 0.00 11 (60) 5.82 0.00
Contract’s indicator 1 11 (94) 16.25 0.00 11 (128) 34.11 0.00 11 (60) 10.18 0.00
Interaction 1 11 (94) 6.96 0.00 11 (128) 11.16 0.00 11 (60) 4.44 0.00
Wu–Hausman test 3 (99) 1.40 0.25 3 (133) 5.54 0.00 3 (65) 0.78 0.51
Sargan test df chi2-val. p-val. df chi2-val. p-val. df chi2-val. p-val.
8 7.69 0.47 8 8.27 0.41 8 2.26 0.97
Notes: Rows show standardized regression coefficients (Est.) and standard errors (S.E.) for the group specific sample.
Regression coefficients are significant with p-values ≤0.01** and ≤0.05*.
Instruments are: log(firm size), firm age, OEM, first-tier supplier, second-tier supplier, trade, service, research intensity, trust indicator
2, contract indicator 2 and interaction 2.
(a) The weak instrument test checks for the null hypothesis that all instruments are weak.
(b) The Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity checks whether the variables are indeed endogenous. The rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates the existence of endogeneity and the need for instrumental variables.
(c) The Sargan test checks the validity of instruments (i.e. whether the instruments are correlated with the error term). The rejection
of the null hypothesis indicates that at least one of the instruments is not valid.
and contract completeness (see Figure 2) and
their interaction in the 95% percentile interval (see
Figures 3 and 4) following Brambor, Clark and
Golder (2006).
Endogeneity tests
Endogeneity biases might affect relationships
in non-experimental designs (Antonakis et al.,
2014; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We undertook
several tests to guard for endogeneity and com-
pare models with a robust maximum-likelihood
(MLR) estimator and two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) estimator. We use the statistical environ-
ment R (R Core Team, 2016) with the packages
‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2012), ‘MIIVsem’ (Fisher et al.,
2016) and ‘AER’ (Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008).
The coefficients of 2SLS estimations are less effi-
cient, but more robust against endogeneity biases
(Antonakis et al., 2010).
Table 5 shows the results of the specification
tests for the MIIVs and the 2SLS estimations. The
weak instrument test shows that the instruments
are suitable for determining the scaling variables
of trust and contract completeness for non-family
firms, non-owner-run family firms and owner-run
family firms (see Models 2a and 3a in Table 5).
The Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity supports
the null in Models 2a and 3a for non-family firms
and owner-run family firms but rejects the null
for non-owner-run family firms. This indicates that
trust or contract are not exogenous in the subsam-
ple of non-owner-run family firms. Accordingly,
the model estimation that includes the interaction
of trust and contract completeness provides results
that are more accurate for these family firms. The
Sargan test for over-identification does not reject
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. Regression of family firm (FF) on different possible explanatory variables for the relationship of FF with trust, respectively
contract completeness
FF classification on: Explanatory variables on:
Explanatory
variables
a
Contract
completeness Trust
Explanatory variable Est. z p
Odds
ratio Est. z p Est. z p
Family firm → −0.235 −2.643 ** 0.204 3.051 **
Focal firm is:
OEM 0.098 0.555 1.103 0.140 1.050 −0.047 −0.558
First tier −0.184 −1.079 0.832 −0.009 −0.073 0.116 1.498
Second tier −0.190 −0.700 0.827 −0.126 −0.648 −0.117 −0.925
Trading company 0.550 2.339 * 1.733 0.432 2.832 ** −0.016 −0.178
Service firm −0.209 −0.942 0.811 0.099 0.571 0.191 1.932 †
Partnering firm is:
OEM 0.052 0.337 1.053 0.004 0.040 −0.203 −2.383 *
First tier −0.159 −0.996 0.853 −0.151 −1.334 −0.045 −0.518
Second tier −0.348 −1.575 0.706 0.098 0.643 −0.183 −1.554
Trading company 0.255 1.298 1.291 −0.054 −0.419 −0.019 −0.204
Service firm −0.105 −0.515 0.900 −0.097 −0.619 −0.088 −0.835
Phase of the collaboration
Beginning 0.138 0.641 1.148 −0.029 −0.204 0.395 3.947 ***
Middle 0.051 0.365 1.052 −0.152 −1.539 0.524 6.632 ***
End 0.075 0.221 1.078 0.151 0.776 0.513 3.564 ***
Innovation stage
Concept development −0.125 −0.620 0.883 −0.108 −0.835 0.183 1.798 †
Concept evaluation −0.258 −1.199 0.772 0.108 0.803 0.112 1.004
Planning and specification −0.541 −2.732 ** 0.582 −0.162 −1.350 −0.071 −0.694
Product development −0.532 −2.655 ** 0.588 −0.028 −0.258 0.025 0.280
Testing and evaluation −0.116 −0.587 0.890 0.222 1.987 * 0.058 0.631
Product launch 0.357 1.826 † 1.429 0.134 1.305 0.053 0.658
Log(collaboration duration) 0.297 3.380 *** n/a
b
0.011 0.195 −0.018 −0.449
Notes: Rows show estimated standardized structural coefficients (Est.) and z-values.
Coefficients are significant with p-values ≤0.001***, ≤0.010**, ≤0.050* and ≤0.100†.
aLogistic regression.
bNo odds ratio available for log(collaboration duration) because this measure is metric.
the null: theMIIVs are uncorrelated with the error
term and thus are valid instruments.
To check for potential endogeneity bias from
omitted variables (Ratzmann, Gudergan and
Bouncken, 2016), we investigate relations of
exogenous alliance characteristics (firm’s and
partnering firm’s position in the supply chain,
collaboration stage, innovation stage, duration of
the collaboration and family firm classification)
on trust and contract completeness.
Tables 6 and 7 show that the family firm clas-
sification (not for owner-run family firms) might
influence trust and contract completeness, and
alliance- and firm-level characteristics influence
trust and contract completeness.
Results
Mutual knowledge creation1 is positively associ-
ated with growing levels of contract completeness
1We included several control variables and find that they
do not predict mutual knowledge creation in non-family
firms (see R2 in Table 4,Model 1 forNFF). In non-owner-
run and owner-run family firms, the controls predict a
small amount of the variance on mutual knowledge cre-
ation. In non-owner-run family firms, the position of the
firm as first-tier supplier indicates higher mutual knowl-
edge creation. In owner-run family firms, higher R&D in-
tensity, firm age and being a service firm predicts higher
mutual knowledge creation. Model 3 (adding contract
completeness and trust) explains significantly more vari-
ance of mutual knowledge creation for all firm types.
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Table 7. Regression of ORFF on different possible explanatory variables for the relationship of ORFF with trust, respectively contract
completeness
ORFF classification on: Explanatory variables on:
Explanatory
variables
a
Contract
completeness Trust
Explanatory variable Est. z p
Odds
ratio Est. z p Est. z p
Owner-run family firm → −0.093 −0.807 0.092 1.225
Focal firm
OEM −0.168 −0.820 0.846 0.073 0.519 −0.071 −0.787
First tier −0.100 −0.480 0.905 −0.016 −0.124 0.142 1.672 †
Second tier −0.202 −0.584 0.817 −0.139 −0.684 −0.170 −1.317
Trading company 0.446 1.865 † 1.562 0.355 2.183 * 0.023 0.229
Service firm 0.053 0.196 1.054 0.142 0.768 0.206 1.986 *
Partnering firm
OEM 0.050 0.272 1.051 −0.023 −0.206 −0.179 −2.000 *
First tier −0.330 −1.676 † 0.719 −0.175 −1.481 −0.008 −0.083
Second tier −0.128 −0.455 0.880 0.068 0.428 −0.265 −2.100 *
Trading company 0.156 0.700 1.169 −0.055 −0.410 −0.013 −0.134
Service firm 0.039 0.163 1.040 −0.088 −0.539 −0.030 −0.282
Phase of the collaboration
Beginning 0.093 0.384 1.097 −0.018 −0.121 0.462 4.526 ***
Middle 0.105 0.637 1.111 −0.145 −1.416 0.538 6.336 ***
End −0.049 −0.119 0.953 0.094 0.460 0.455 2.962 **
Innovation stage
Concept development −0.317 −1.371 0.728 −0.126 −0.921 0.231 2.113 *
Concept evaluation −0.481 −1.864 † 0.618 0.097 0.663 0.086 0.710
Planning and specification −0.400 −1.744 † 0.670 −0.053 −0.430 −0.090 −0.844
Product development −0.086 −0.397 0.917 0.005 0.045 0.033 0.354
Testing and evaluation −0.105 −0.473 0.901 0.130 1.103 0.028 0.281
Product launch 0.100 0.460 1.105 0.091 0.852 0.061 0.717
Log(collaboration duration) 0.070 0.659 n/a
b −0.020 −0.352 −0.008 −0.194
Notes: Rows show estimated standardized structural coefficients (Est.) and z-values.
Coefficients are significant with p-values ≤0.001***, ≤0.01**, ≤0.05* and ≤0.10†.
aLogistic regression.
bNo odds ratio available for log(collaboration duration) because this measure is metric.
only in non-family firms (γ = 0.31, p = 0.00,
Model 2 in Table 4), not for non-owner-run family
firms or owner-run family firms. These findings
are replicated in the 2SLS estimations (Model 2 in
Table 5). The path difference of contract complete-
ness on mutual knowledge creation is significant
and negative for the multi-group comparison of
non-owner-run family firms versus non-family
firms (γNRFF-NFF = −0.21, p = 0.04; Table 8),
which supports Hypothesis 1a (see left in
Figure 2). Similar effects relate to the compari-
son of owner-run family firms versus non-family
firms (γORFF-NFF = −0.20, p = 0.08; Table 8),
supporting Hypothesis 1b.
Although trust increases mutual knowledge
creation for non-family firms (γ = 0.27, p = 0.00)
and for non-owner-run family firms (γ = 0.35,
p = 0.00), the multi-group comparison of non-
owner-run family firms versus non-family firms is
non-significant (γ FF-NFF = 0.05, p = 0.62). The
multi-group comparison indicates no support for
Hypotheses 2a or 2b.
Hypothesis 3 predicts the interaction of con-
tract completeness with trust. Model 3 in Table 4
shows non-significance for the interaction path
for non-family firms (γ = 0.02, p = 0.78), a sig-
nificant negative interaction path for non-owner-
run family firms (γ = −0.17, p = 0.01) and
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Table 8. Multi-group comparison between non-owner-run family firms (NRFF) (respectively owner-run family firms (ORFF)) and non-
family firms (NFF)
NRFF vs. NFF ORFF vs. NFF
Path on MKC Path difference z-Value p-Value Hypothesis Path difference z-Value p-Value Hypothesis
Log(firm size) −0.006 −0.092 0.927 −0.019 −0.262 0.793
Firm age 0.000 −0.007 0.995 0.041 0.650 0.516
OEM −0.028 −0.122 0.903 0.112 0.366 0.714
First tier 0.361† 1.771 0.077 −0.062 −0.224 0.823
Second tier −0.132 −0.468 0.640 −0.012 −0.025 0.980
Trading company −0.396 −1.279 0.201 −0.412 −1.136 0.256
Service firm 0.025 0.092 0.927 0.202 0.610 0.542
R&D intensity 0.002 0.133 0.894 0.010 1.364 0.173
Contract completeness (CON) −0.205* −2.049 0.040 H1a −0.196† −1.776 0.076 H1b
Trust (TRU) 0.053 0.493 0.622 H2a −0.101 −0.840 0.401 H2b
CON × TRU −0.173† −1.765 0.078 H3a −0.051 −0.434 0.665
Note: Path differences are significant with p-values ≤0.05* and
†≤0.10.
Table 9. Multi-group comparison between non-owner-run family firms (NRFF) and owner-run family firms (ORFF)
Path on MKC Path difference z-Value p-Value Hypothesis
Log(firm size) 0.013 0.167 0.867
Firm age −0.006 −1.298 0.194
OEM −0.140 −0.485 0.627
First tier 0.423 1.608 0.108
Second tier −0.121 −0.258 0.797
Trading company 0.016 0.052 0.959
Service firm −0.177 −0.602 0.547
R&D intensity −0.009 −0.622 0.534
Contract completeness (CON) −0.009 −0.084 0.933
Trust (TRU) 0.154 1.235 0.217
CON × TRU −0.122 −1.118 0.264 H3b
non-significance interaction for owner-run fam-
ily firms (γ = −0.03, p = 0.74). The multi-group
comparison supports Hypothesis 3a partially for
non-owner-run family firms (γ = −0.17, p = 0.08;
Table 8), indicating supporting a more negative in-
teraction of contract completeness with trust for
family firms versus non-family firms.
Table 9 shows the multi-group comparison of
non-owner-run versus owner-run family firms. The
results do not support Hypothesis 3b, which ex-
pected a stronger negative interaction among con-
tract completeness and trust for owner-run than
for non-owner-run family firms (γ = −0.12, p =
0.26; Table 9). We find a strong negative interac-
tion only for non-owner-run family firms (Model
3 in Table 4).
To interpret the difference of the interaction
effect between non-owner-run and owner-run
family firms, we draw the marginal effects for the
different groups in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 4 shows
that when non-owner-run family firms trust their
partners, they can achieve above-average gains
on mutual knowledge creation, but only when
contracts are not overly complete, which spoil
those advantages (see right side of Figure 3).
However, contract completeness does not have
the assumed overall negative effect. When trust is
very low (left side of Figure 3), contract complete-
ness has a preventive effect. When non-owner-run
family firms do not trust their alliance partner,
more complete contracts achieve at least average
gains of mutual knowledge creation. Under low
contract completeness, the influence of trust in-
creases mutual knowledge creation (left-side chart
in Figure 4). Once trust is present, contracts that
are more complete damage this positive impact
of trust on mutual knowledge creation (right-side
chart in Figure 4). The plot of upper and lower
confidence intervals above and below the zero line
indicates that the influence of trust on mutual
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knowledge creation at high contract completeness
is without substance.
Discussion
Contribution to the literature
Our study examined differences between family
and non-family firms in how trust and contract
completeness influencemutual knowledge creation
in alliances. In specifying family firms, we consid-
ered if those relationships change among owner-
run and non-owner-run family firms. Our results
extend and specify previous family firm research.
Existing studies report that family firms rely on
trustful relations to acquire knowledge (Herrero
and Hughes, 2019). Our study finds that for the
mutual creation of knowledge, family firms (non-
owner-run and owner-run) draw sucessfully on
trust solely, while non-family firms can either ben-
efit from trust or from contract completeness. As a
theory extension and specification, findings bring
the dynamic relational view towards family firms.
We extend family firm research, which has empha-
sized that family firms favour stable and trustful
relationships for the long-term viability of their en-
terprise (Arregle et al., 2007;Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005).
Specifically, we first reveal that neither substitu-
tive nor complementary logics apply to how family
firms benefit from specific alliance governance
mechanisms. Family firms (non-owner-run and
owner-run) benefit the most by forging trust in
their alliances as a means of social enforcement.
When operating on trust, family firms enact ex-
pectations and agreements based on bond or
word over and above contract completeness. Thus,
family firms benefit from trustful ties, which pro-
mote social processes, partner-specific absorptive
capacity and learning as set out in the dynamic
relational view (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and
Singh, 1998). Trusting reduces search, screening,
evaluation, enforcement and formal oversight
costs, and, per our results, prompts an increase
in mutual knowledge creation. Trust is neither
substitutive nor complementary to contracting
but neither is contracting destructive on its own to
family firms. Their reliance on trust indicates that
contracts are not a meaningful solution to their
alliance governance needs. Rather, the free flow of
information depends on an atmosphere of trust,
particularly when partners create resources coop-
eratively. As set out in the dynamic relational view,
trustful ties create relational rents and can help
firms improve their partner-specific understanding
and discover further complementarities in mutual
knowledge creation (Weber, Bauke and Raibulet,
2016). Trust then creates an atmosphere in which
mutual knowledge creation can flourish and foster
innovation. Trust relates to a normative logic of
collaborative behaviour (Täuscher, Bouncken,
and Pesch, 2020). The emphasis of trust rather
than contract completeness relates to the view
that family firm managers substitute rational cal-
culations with relational logic to maintain family
sovereignty. The family firm will straddle the al-
liance work with the family management mode of
the unification of ownership and control, placing
a high premium on protecting its decision rights,
maintaining and protecting the family interest
and protecting against unwarranted access to the
family firm’s assets by external parties. In this situ-
ation, trust has a greater role in informing alliance
decision-making than contracts, and these results
coincide with previous research on trust and its
importance for family firms (Eddleston et al.,
2010). By using trust, family firms can extend
their preference for trust-based coordination to
alliances.
Second, and in contrast to family firms, non-
family firms can benefit from either contracts or
trust, indicating substitutability for these types of
firms as expected (Bouncken, Clauß and Fredrich,
2016). The alliance governance literature disagrees
on substitution versus complementary effects
(Cao and Lumineau, 2015). However, theorizing
about alliance governance frequently starts from
the assumption that firms freely display and use
both mechanisms, even going so far as to suggest
that firms (family or non-family) can benefit from
the advantages of both (Carney, 2005). Our results
indicate that only non-family firms can substitute
formal and informal governance mechanisms in
alliances. Compared to family firms, non-family
firms can apply their managerial mode based on
the separation of ownership and control to an al-
liance mode typically based on contracts (Carney,
2005). Contracts may act as safeguards for man-
agers and positive signalling towards stakeholders,
but non-family firms may also change to more
trust-based logics in uncertain situations and
when dynamic and open social relationships are
necessary, as for mutual knowledge creation. Our
results thus explain some of the heterogeneity of
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previous alliance results (Cao and Lumineau,
2015), especially the disagreement over the
substitutive or complementary effects of trust
and contracts (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009).
The negative interaction of trust and con-
tract completeness applies for non-owner-run fam-
ily firms only. Non-owner managers seem to
find it especially difficult to merge a calculative
logic towards contracts with the relational trust
logic of the family (firm). Ambiguities that non-
owner managers experience, and their situation
sandwiched between governance optimization and
family influence, interfere in their strategic man-
agement.
Owner-managers are imbued with an under-
standing of their business and the need for inno-
vation for longer-term survival and prosperity, but
they also have an intuitive understanding of how
much risk they can take to ensure survival and how
they operate with other firms (Miller et al., 2015).
The concentration of ownership and control on
the owner-manager reduces opportunism (Ander-
son and Reeb, 2003), and owner-managers can act
with considerable latitude and power in the best in-
terests of the family and the firm simultaneously.
Their freedom to commit firm assets into alliances
based on trust is also far greater. Carney (2005)
observed that ‘uniting ownership and control mit-
igates the classic agency problems inherent in…
alliance governance because owner-managers’ in-
terests in growth opportunities and risk-bearing
are one and the same’ (p. 254). The non-owner
manager of a family firm is in a far more com-
plicated agency relationship. The non-owner man-
ager faces considerable oversight and scrutiny as
family members are incentivized to monitor its
managerial agents closely to ensure that non-
ownermanagers do not divert resources into value-
destroying activities or take actions that might
harm their wealth (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).
This view of the non-owner manager assumes
that he/she is likely to act outside the interests of
the family. Our results paint a different picture.
Trust is even more important for non-owner-run
family firms, demonstrating strong preferences for
trust-based allying. For family-controlled but non-
owner-run firms, the contract logic gives way to
an internal agency logic informing the best predic-
tions about alliance governance and its outcomes.
For owner-run family firms, committing firm as-
sets ‘on a handshake’ (Blyler and Coff, 2003) and
‘axes of solidarity’ are farmore important, empha-
sizing the relational view. Still, family firms—non-
owner-run and owner-run alike—need preventive
measures to not lose control: either trust or a well
thought through contract that allows freedom and
creativity for mutual knowledge creation.
Third, we reveal that the benefit of trust is nega-
tivelymoderated by contract completeness only for
non-owner-run family firms. The highly interde-
pendent influence of trust and contract complete-
ness on mutual knowledge creation in non-owner
family firms suggests that the behaviour of man-
agers and their decisions about trust and contracts
with the alliance partner are different from owner-
run family firms. The tension suggests the primacy
of stewardship theory to agency theory to explain
behaviour, supporting the trust and learning argu-
ments in the dynamic relational view.
While non-family managers might be expected
to act with greater self-interest (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976), stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman
andDonaldson, 1997) does not foresee an inherent
conflict of interest and assumes that non-family
managers are copacetic to the needs of owners.
Non-owner managers’ interests are aligned with
the family to protect the family’s wealth, and
non-owner managers act even more carefully than
might be expected, even by comparison to owner-
run family firms, evidenced by non-owner-run
family firms placing an even greater premium on
trust (over and above contracts) as expected of
an owner-run family firm. The family owner has
an intuitive understanding of the risk they can
bear, whereas the non-family owner must serve
to protect it carefully. The non-owner manager is
then conditioned by the family firm to appreciate
the vital importance of trust. Consistent with
the relational view, mutual knowledge creation
demands openness and brings risks of knowledge
leakage. Conflict may cause failure of the alliance
and family firm owners will hold the manager
accountable for leakage and failure. Non-owner
managers are at greater risk of being held account-
able when contracts are excessively well-defined,
because they may restrict the family’s autonomy
and introduce external monitoring and oversight,
contrary to a family’s desire to protect self-control
(Carney, 2005).
Our findings on non-family firms show that con-
tract completeness – and not only trust – is a
mechanism to mutually create knowledge. Non-
family firms appear to need the converging force of
contracts to articulate conflicting opinions and to
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merge them into a newmutual knowledge creation
process. Contracts deliver rules and resources that
guide the interaction and creation of the couplings,
exchanges and creative processes among firms. The
confidence given by the contract can secure shared
meaning among alliance partners, which demands
to refine, draw on or modify previous information
and the meaning ascribed to it by asking ques-
tions, requiring feedback, experimenting and dis-
cussing failures within the alliance (Edmondson
et al., 2003). Hence, for alliances, family firms and
non-family firms follow different somehow institu-
tionalized logics.
Limitations and recommendations for future
research
Our research faces some boundary conditions and
limitations. Theories are based on assumptions
that contain embedded, sometimes tacit, values
related to the theory (Bacharach, 1989; Kuhn,
1962, 1977). The more socially oriented relational
view departs from the classic homo-economicus
assumption (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), which
has driven research on the use of contracts (e.g.
transaction cost theory). Research on coordi-
nation in alliances has combined arguments on
contracts and trust, releasing the traditional
homo-economicus assumption. We study alliance
coordination from a relational view that aims to
combine formerly incommensurable logics. A key
boundary condition is that we considered only
contracts and trust as coordination mechanisms
and not power and dependency (Bacharach, 1989).
Alliances bear heterogeneity in terms of contracts,
trust, hierarchical control, power and dependency,
or to which degree other safeguards and appro-
priability mechanisms are present (Bradach and
Eccles, 1989; Miozzo et al., 2016). Considering
the heterogeneity of alliances and family firms, we
might not be able to explain how trust and con-
tracts underlie mutual knowledge creation when
alliances are strongly coordinated by powerful
firms. Trust and contracts might have little impact
for the dependent firm. Moreover, our findings
might not transfer to industries different to those
we study, such as industries that require formal
safeguards, rely strongly on interpersonal relation-
ships or flexible alliance coordination (Bouncken,
2011; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010).
Our study focused on one firm in the alliance
only. Alliance governance may be a result of nego-
tiation between the parties involved. Accordingly,
future research should examine alliance dyads.
Understanding the detailed instruments that
may help (or hinder) the development of mutual
knowledge creation (e.g. joint meetings, control
or joint creativity sessions), and differences in
domestic and international alliances, are also of
value for future studies.
The threat of misappropriation or inappropriate
behaviour triggers a demand for control. Family
firms have a wider number of governance tools at
their disposal, including family trust, councils and
boards that extend the direct control that a family
firm can apply to an alliance. We expect that fam-
ily firms would favour greater predictability but
would seek it by allying with like-minded firms and
creating or seeking trust. Non-family firms would
seek control by way of regulatory processes. Our
findings offer evidence that contract completeness
had no effect on mutual knowledge creation for
family firms but did in their non-family counter-
parts. Trust was vital for family firms instead. Fu-
ture research examining specific control mecha-
nisms and antecedents that make the attainment
of desirable goals more predictable would help ad-
vance our contribution. Firms develop contracts
during the formation of the alliance, but trust and
power differentials develop and change during the
evolvement of the alliance. This evolution could
influence knowledge creation, especially among
owner-run and non-owner-run family firms.
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